AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION-MAKING BEHAVIOR OF THREE INTERESTED PARTIES IN THE PROCESS OF PRIVATE UNIVERSITY EDUCATION REFORM

In response to the current situation in which an imbalance in educational redistribution has led to an inefficient and slow educational environment in the long-term, difficulty in satisfying the interests of subjects, and a lack of effective targeting of school policy measures, an SD evolutionary game model targeting educational reform, with schools, administrative institutions, and professors as the three parties, was established. Based on expected utility theory and Lyapunov’s first law, a feedback regulation simulation study was conducted on subjects’ decision-making behavior. The research results show that: the evolutionary trajectory of the subjects in the game is affected by the redistribution of education funding benefits, but the evolution of the final system is in a state of stable equilibrium (push, reform, reform); the decision-making behavior of the pushing party plays a decisive role in the stability of the system, and if the education subsidies of university professors and the income from the value of research results are greater than the education subsidies before the education reform, evolution over time is conducive to prompting the professor group to prefer the education reform strategy, while the effect of school push on the stability of the educational reform system is significant in schools with lower returns on the value of research funding.