Terrorist attacks and corporate investment: The beneficial value of CEO overconfidence

Hyeong Joon Kim, Seongjae Mun

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study examines whether terrorist attacks influence corporate investments and firm value. We expect that overconfident CEOs can mitigate the underinvestment problem caused by terrorist attacks because they overestimate the returns on investment. Using measures of terrorist attack proximity in the U.S., we find that firms with non-overconfident CEOs significantly decrease their investment growth when terrorist attacks affect them, while firms with overconfident CEOs do not. Consequently, the impact of terrorist attacks on firm value varies between firms with overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. Overall, this study suggests that CEO overconfidence can benefit shareholder value under certain conditions, such as terrorist attacks.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102363
JournalInternational Review of Financial Analysis
Volume84
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2022

Keywords

  • CEO overconfidence
  • Corporate investment
  • Firm value
  • Terrorist attacks
  • Underinvestment problem

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